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Abstract - The absence of economies of scale is a major barrier in use of renewable energy sources 
in small and dispersed off-grid remote communities. For example, in northern Canada, diesel is 
currently the main source of electricity and heat generation. Coordination of biomass supply chains 
could play a key role in improving the cost efficiency and reliability of bioenergy generation 
through bundled ordering and creation of storage hubs. In this study, a supply chain management 
model with multiple suppliers and multiple end-user communities is formulated. The proposed 
model enables us to analyse and compare the outcomes of adopting a cooperative coordination 
strategy (with a joint pay-off for communities) versus a non-cooperative coordination strategy 
(with individual payoffs for communities). Other peculiar attributes of the proposed model rest in 
the addressing of restricted ordering schedules and quantities (due to unavailability of pathways) 
by advocating nonlinear ordering and distribution costs (to incorporate quantity discounts) 
achieved through coordinated and/or collective inventories. A real biomass supply chain case study 
of three northernmost Nunavik communities in Quebec is considered to show the applicability of 
the model and provide insights for uptake of bioenergy sources in remote off-grid communities.        
Keywords: Bioenergy; supply chain coordination; optimization; scheduling; logistics; remote 
communities  




Energy supply is a key factor for survival of the communities in northern Canada and in 
maintaining and enhancing the quality of life for citizens of this region, given the extreme weather 
conditions experienced in this part of Canada. Lack of connectivity to the main grid and other 
permanent carriers of energy sources (such as pipelines) have forced these communities to rely on 
stand-alone off-grid energy generation facilities (Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) 2011). The 
vast majority of these remote communities rely on fossil fuels, and in particular diesel, as the main 
source of energy (National Energy Board (NEB) 2016). Diesel is mostly shipped from the major 
cities (in the south) in spring and summer via the waterways or roads depending on their availability 
(e.g. mainly covered by ice in the winter). The reliance on one type of fuel and its supply chain has 
made these communities even more vulnerable.  
A transition to renewable sources of energy in northern Canada could not only diversify the 
supply mix, enhancing the resilience of the communities, but also would be a step towards reducing 
the generation of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada. However, the remoteness and dispersion of 
these small northern communities diminishes the economies of scale. In that sense, the fixed (and 
mostly capital) costs associated with energy production facilities will be spread across smaller 
quantities of energy increasing the unit cost of energy production (per Kwh). This has been a 
discouragement for investment in building and maintaining renewable energy facilities in the 
region. In addition, the generated energy from renewable sources could be less affordable for the 
residents compared to the diesel option (NEB 2016).  
In comparison with diesel, biomass is well positioned to be used as a replacement or back-up 
fuel in northern communities due to its carbon abatement potentials. As a fuel-based option, it 
could be transported to the region through similar logistics arrangements that exist for diesel with 
a number of shipment companies (Rahman 2014). It is worth mentioning that the biomass from 
agricultural and forestry residues is abundant across Canada (Paré et al. 2011), from diverse/varied 
materials, locations and suppliers.  
In comparison with other renewable energy sources, biomass facilities are typically associated 
with a lower levelized capital and operational cost (excluding hydro) (Ellabban et al. 2014, IRENA 
2018). The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is established by calculating the total cost of 
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electricity generation (capital and operation & maintenance) over the service life of facilities and 
distributing it per unit of electricity generated (International Renewable Energy Association 
(IRENA) 2018). LCOE could be calculated with inclusion or exclusion of fuel costs. In Canada, 
the levelized costs of electricity generation from wind, solar, and biomass are reported in ranges of 
[0.07,0.31], [0.11,0.35], and [0.06,0.26] in $/KWh, respectively (NEB 2017). The energy 
conversion and loading factors of biomass energy facilities are also higher than that of wind and 
solar energy technologies (Ellabban et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2018). The loading factor is a measure 
corresponding to the efficiency of energy production calculated as the ratio of average (generated) 
energy to the demand (at peak) (IRENA 2018). From a technological perspective, it could represent 
the percentage of facility uptime with electricity output. Moreover, small scale bioenergy 
technologies are manufactured with high levels of standardization, while the solar and wind 
technologies are mostly project-based and their performance highly depends on the characteristics 
of each specific site. In addition, the focus on solid biomass stems from the fact that liquid (wood-
based) biodiesel is much more costly (Sarkar et al., 2011) and has poorer environmental 
performance due to the large consumption of non-renewable resources as well as carbon emissions 
during the ethanol production process (Neupane, et al., 2013). Therefore, biomass is an available 
and potentially efficient energy source for stakeholders wishing to seek alternatives to legacy 
energy sources such as diesel. As such, the use of biomass as a source for energy generation has 
increased by 35% in terms of installed capacities in northern Canada since year 2006 (NEB 2016). 
In general, bioenergy supply chain management has several peculiar attributes (Rentizelas  et 
al. 2009; Grant and Clarke 2010; Mafakheri and Nasiri 2014; Nasiri et al. 2016; Sun et al. 2018; 
Zandi Atashbar et al. 2018). Variation in type and quality of biomass materials imposes varied 
transportation and storage requirements in order to minimize moisture accumulation or spoilage. 
In addition, some sources of biomass materials (such as agricultural residues) are not available 
throughout the year or their supply fluctuates considerably over time (Yazan et al. 2011).  
There are several specific challenges with respect to the supply of biomass to northern 
communities. First, biomass materials are diverse and their suppliers are spatially dispersed in 
Canada, with varied supply capacities and variability, making it challenging to recognize a specific 
biomass supply pathway for remote communities in northern Canada (Canadian Bioenergy 
Association (CanBio) 2014). The communities, on the other hand, are also spatially dispersed. Such 
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attributes elevate the risk of biomass supply discontinuity and shortage against the backdrop of 
extreme weather conditions in the north (and the greater need for continuous supply of energy). 
Consequently, aggregated biomass inventories and supply chain coordination are part of the 
solutions to improve the economies of scale and reduce the associated risks for adoption of biomass 
energy in northern communities in Canada. 
In the sense of the above facts, this study proposes a bioenergy supply chain coordination model 
incorporating biomass hubs to address the efficiency and logistics challenges. The model 
incorporates the peculiar attributes of the remote communities including geographical dispersion, 
absence of economies of scale, and accessibility perspectives. There could be two pathways for 
coordination. A non-cooperative scenario in which the supply of biomass is coordinated (i.e. 
coordination of suppliers), and a cooperative scenario in which both supply and ordering (demand) 
of biomass are coordinated (i.e. coordination of suppliers and demand from the communities). In 
the non-cooperative coordination scenario, each community optimizes its own payoff with access 
to aggregated inventories at hubs. In the cooperative coordination scenario, a collective pay-off is 
optimized with access to collective inventories as well as orders through hubs. In doing so, the 
model enables us to get insights into the impact of ordering restrictions (on order quantities and 
timings), purchase and distribution quantity discounts, as well as collective inventories in 
enhancing the share of biomass under each coordination scenario.  
In the following sections, first, a literature review is presented on supply chain coordination. A 
description of the proposed model is then provided along with the details of the governing 
constraints and requirements in both coordination cases. A case study of select communities in 
northern Quebec will be investigated followed by an analysis of the results and discussions. Finally, 
the paper concludes by summarizing the key elements of the proposed model, the case study, 
assumptions and limitations, as well as avenues for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section examines the literature that underpins this research and focuses primarily on the nature 
and benefits that previous research has attributed to supply chain coordination. A particular 
attention is given to highlight the literature about supply chain coordination when the ordering and 
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supply quantities are small and there is restriction on delivery schedules while the demand is steady. 
These characteristics resemble the case of biomass supply to remote communities. As such, the 
potential import for a biomass supply chain coordination approach and model for northern remote 
communities in Canada is then discussed by integrating three mainstream supply chain 
coordination mechanisms identified in the literature paving the path for the propositions that follow 
in the methodology section. 
 Supply chain coordination accounts for vertical arrangements (in form of partnership 
contracts) among various layers of supply chains (supplier, retailer, and end-user of products) or 
horizontal alignments (in form of cooperation and collective decision making) among competitors 
(excluding suppliers) (Chan 2019). The main target of a coordination scheme is to either increase 
the profitability of involved parties (Chaharsooghi and Heydari 2010) or reduce the risk of back 
orders (Mena et al. 2013; Giri and Bardhan 2015; Cai et al. 2019). There are various mechanisms 
suggested in the literature to establish supply chain coordination. 
 Quantity discounts have been considered as a means of coordination to encourage retailers 
to establish higher inventories, thereby minimizing backorders (Heydari 2014; Huang et al. 2015; 
Sarkar 2016). A quantity discount as a sole coordination mechanism could motivate retailers to 
extend their ordering times in order to increase the quantity of each order (less frequent orders in 
bigger batches), increasing the risk of back orders (Zhang et al. 2014). To address this issue, 
advance order payments, in combination with quantity discounts, have been proposed as a way of 
ensuring on-time orders from retailers (Zhang et al. 2014; Tong et al. 2019). Temporary and time-
based quantity discounts are also suggested to serve as incentives not only for the quantity of 
orders, but also for the timing of deliveries (Alaei and Setak 2015). Consequently, an optimal 
schedule for the discounts (as a function of quantity and time) was proposed, which allocates the 
incentives on a temporary basis such that to encourage suppliers’ commitment to on-time 
deliveries.     
Revenue/cost sharing is also considered as an alternative mechanism to encourage alignment 
of involved parties in a partnership model (Hou et al. 2017). Mafakheri and Nasiri (2013) proposed 
a leader-follower revenue-sharing game in a two-echelon supply chain of supplier-retailer. They 
explored the assignment of a leadership position (the party that offers shared revenues) to supplier 
and retailer, and compared the performance of each setting from cost and environmental 
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perspectives. Oliviera et al. (2013) have analysed the impact of bilateral (revenue or cost sharing) 
contracts, as a means of supply chain coordination, in the electricity industry, using a game 
theoretic model. They have suggested a two-part tariff as the best bilateral contract option in 
improving the efficiency and profitability of the suppliers.    
Finally, multi-level inventory planning has also been investigated as a means of promoting 
coordination in supply chains. This network scale approach is particularly well-suited to fostering 
coordination among demand points with small order quantities (such as communities of the 
northern Quebec). This approach could improve the economies of scale in the long-term (through 
establishing aggregated distribution inventories) and minimizing the risk of shortage in short-term 
(through maintaining local retailer/end user inventories). There are several examples of supply 
chain models with multi-level inventories in the literature. Ganeshan (1999) proposed a single 
objective cost minimization model for a supply chain network consisting of multiple suppliers and 
retailers as well as a single warehouse as the distribution and coordination point. The holding, 
ordering, and transport costs for maintaining inventories at the retailers and warehouse were 
incorporated into the above mentioned objective function to direct a coordinated inventory plan 
consisting of optimal order quantities and their schedule. Minner (2003) presented a survey of 
supply chain network models with multi-level inventories at the supplier, distribution, and retailer 
points. They concluded that the incorporation of suppliers’ competition, through offering 
preferential pricing and quantity discounts, has not been explored in the literature. Shahabi et al. 
(2013) presented an integrated supply chain coordination model with addition of hubs into the 
supply chain network. The hubs serve as a consolidating point for the retailers with proximate 
locations, thus improving the economies of scale by reducing the unit transport and holding costs. 
Their proposed model, however, did not consider a capacity for the hubs and the suppliers’ prices 
did not involve a quantity discount.  
Considering the earlier mentioned challenges in biomass supply chains, in particular as relates 
to remote communities, this paper proposes integration of the mainstream supply chain 
coordination mechanisms of quantity discounts, cost sharing, and multi-level inventories with 
incorporation of biomass storage hubs. The hubs will serve as the main driver to coordinate 
ordering and/or storage activities for targeted communities and to enhance the economies of scale 
for a biomass supply chain network of spatially dispersed suppliers and communities. In particular, 
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the hubs could trigger higher quantity discounts in biomass purchasing and transport. This bi-level 
inventory planning approach (with storage capacities at hubs and communities) will reduce the risk 
of biomass shortage, as the local storage capacities in communities will be arranged to meet the 
short-term needs of the communities while the hubs could secure a steady supply of biomass 
throughout the year. In addition, the proposed model could consider the possibility of switching to 
an alternative fuel (i.e. diesel) in case of biomass shortage or if/when the marginal cost of energy 
production from biomass surpasses that of the alternative fuel (Nasiri et al 2016). We will consider 
alternative biomass supply chain coordination scenarios with cost sharing among communities 
(cooperative scenario) and without cost sharing among them (non-cooperative). Considering these 
coordination arrangements, in the following section,  a bi-level and bi-fuel energy supply chain 
optimization model will be formulated to identify the optimal schedule for production of energy 
from biomass and diesel, the optimal order quantities and schedule from suppliers and hubs, and 
the subsequent inventory requirements at the community and hub levels.   
 
3. Methodology 
Reflecting on the case of biomass supply chains for northern Canada, a network comprising of end-
user communities and biomass suppliers is considered. As these communities are relatively small, 
a collective (bundled) delivery of biomass from suppliers to these communities could improve the 
economies of scale by reducing the unit costs resulting from transport. The bundling of deliveries 
could also attract pricing discounts from biomass suppliers. This bundling (coordination) of 
biomass deliveries could be in place through a shared biomass purchase-distribution channel (hubs) 
with or without a joint cost sharing agreement (cooperation) of the receiving communities. The 
former situation would be a cooperative coordination, whereas the latter points to a non-cooperative 
coordination. As such, the multiplicity of these communities justifies the incorporation of biomass 
storage hubs as not only a place to establish aggregated (coordinated) inventories, but also a 
mechanism to cluster the communities from a biomass distribution perspective. These communities 
could be involved in such an arrangement independently (non-cooperatively) or through a joint 
cost sharing agreement (cooperatively).Figure 1 presents a generic representation of a supply chain 
network with suppliers, hubs and local inventories (i.e. the end user communities).  
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Each hub is expected to be served by a subset of the participating suppliers based on their 
price, distance and transport cost. A hub is also expected to serve as a representative point for 
participating communities given their distance and geographical dispersion. Therefore, an 
optimization model representing such a network for biomass supply to northern communities shall 
consider the possible pathways between suppliers and hubs as well as the clustered communities 
served by each hub. In addition, to enhance the economies of scale, optimal coordinated inventory 
plans and ordering (delivery) quantities and schedules at the hub and local storage shall be 
identified during the planning horizon. On that basis, the switching (substitution) schedule between 
alternative fuels (biomass and diesel) will also be directed.  
In the sequel, a supply chain network optimization model is proposed. This model could be 
formulated under a non-cooperative coordination scenario with individual communities 
minimizing their individual costs or a cooperative coordination scenario minimizing a total 
collective cost of biomass supply chain network  with a substitute fuel (diesel) as back-up. 
Collective quantity discounts as well as aggregation of inventories in hubs are considered as the 
means of fostering the coordination of biomass orders and deliveries. In addition, higher end-user 
energy prices (several times more than southern cities) could act as an incentive for diversification 
of fuel sources. Due to these discounts/incentives, prices and costs will be influenced by quantities 
leading to a nonlinear (quadratic) biomass supply chain network optimization problem.   
Over a planning horizon of T (i.e. 𝑡𝑡 = 1,2, …𝑇𝑇), the costs are comprised of 
purchasing/delivery costs from the point of supply, holding cost at the hubs, delivery costs from 
hubs to local inventories, holding cost at local inventories, and energy conversion costs from 
biomass and the alternative fuel.   
In a non-cooperative coordination scenario, each community optimizes its own payoff 
represented by Eq. 1.1 (that includes cost of biomass ordering from hubs, local storage costs, and 
energy generation cost). The hub will also act as an individual player maximizing its payoff 
represented by Eq. 1.2 (that includes revenue from selling biomass to communities as well as 
sourcing and hub storage costs). This will pose a multi-objective optimization problem as follows:  
Minimize            𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) = ∑ [𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 . 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 . 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 . �𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)� + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗




Maximize 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇)    = ∑ [∑ ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡).𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 − ∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡). 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) −𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 ∑ 𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘.ℎ𝑘𝑘
(𝑡𝑡)𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1 ]
  (1.2) 
{𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑀𝑀 (supliers); 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, …𝑁𝑁 (communities);𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, …𝐾𝐾 (hubs)} 
 
In a cooperative coordination scenario, a collective payoff (including the costs associated with 
biomass sourcing (purchasing and transport from suppliers), hub storage, delivery to communities, 
storage at communities, and energy generation) optimized as presented in Eq. 1.3: 
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               +∑ ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 . 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1 +𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0 ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 . [𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)] 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡=0   (1.3) 
 
The decision variables are as follows: 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡): Biomass delivery from supplier ‘i’ to hub centre ‘k’ at time ‘t’ (Kg) 
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡): Biomass delivery from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (eKg) 
𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡): Electricity generation from biomass in community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (KWh) 
 
And parameters of the model are listed as follows: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡): Biomass price (including transportation) offered by supplier ‘i’ for delivery to hub centre 
‘k’ at time ‘t’ ($/Kg) 
𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘: Holding cost at hub ‘k’ per unit of time ($/Kg) 
ℎ𝑘𝑘




(𝑡𝑡): Biomass ordering/delivery cost from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ ($/Kg)  
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗: Holding cost at local biomass inventory of community ‘j’ per unit of time ($/Kg)  
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡): Local biomass inventory level at community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (Kg)  
𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗: Delivery time between hub ‘k’ and community ‘j’ (Month) 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗: Levelized biomass-to-electricity conversion cost in community ‘j’ including capital and 
operational costs ($/KWh) 
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗: Levelized electricity generation cost from alternative (diesel) fuel in facility of community ‘j’ 
at time ‘t’ including capital, operational and fuel costs ($/KWh) 
𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡): Electricity demand of community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (KWh) 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘: Delivery time between supplier ‘i’ and hub ‘k’ (Month) 
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗: Biomass conversion rate in biomass-to-electricity conversion facility of community ‘j’ 
(KWh/Kg) 
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗: Capacity of biomass electricity generation facility in community ‘j’ (KW) 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗: Loading factor of biomass electricity generation facility in community ‘j’  
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗: Capacity of local biomass inventory at community ‘j’ (Kg) 
ℎ𝑘𝑘: Capacity of hub ‘k’ (Kg) 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: Biomass supply capacity of supplier ‘i’ (Kg) 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈: Biomass price of supplier ‘i’ with no discount ($/Kg)    
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿: Biomass price of supplier ‘i’ with full discount ($/Kg) 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 : Biomass order/delivery cost from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ with no discount ($/Kg) 




Subject to the following constraints: 




(𝑡𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗�𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘� − 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)/𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1  ; 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(0) = 0   (2) 
 




(𝑡𝑡−1) + ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘)𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=1  ; ℎ𝑘𝑘
(0) = 0   (3) 
- Biomass energy production levels (subject to demand profile of the communities): 
𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀(720 ∗ 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 ,𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡))      (4) 
- Local storage capacities:  
0 ≤ 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) ≤ 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗         (5) 
- Storage capacities at the hubs: 
0 ≤ ℎ𝑘𝑘
(𝑡𝑡) ≤ ℎ𝑘𝑘        (6) 
- Suppliers’ capacities (for biomass purchase): 
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) ≤𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖        (7) 
- Biomass pricing with quantity discounts from the suppliers (as a function of purchase and 
capacities): 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 − (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 − 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿)
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖
      (8) 
- Distribution costs with quantity discounts for biomass deliveries from hubs: 








      (9.1) 
As a function of collective orders and hub capacities (in cooperative scenario):  
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 − (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 − 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 )
∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)𝑁𝑁𝑘𝑘=1
ℎ𝑘𝑘
     (9.2) 
With respect to the following decision variables (assuming K < M and N): 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡),𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡), 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) ≥ 0       (10) 
In case of a non-cooperative scenario, the multi-objective optimization problem presented by 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸. 1.1, and Eq. 1.2, can be rewritten as a compromise programming problem (Para et al. 2005; 
André and Romero 2008). In this sense, the single objective optimization solutions for individual 
objectives are identified. The best and worst solutions among them are used to transform the multi-
objective optimization problem to a single objective one as follows: 
Maximize 𝜆𝜆         (11) 
Subject to the following additional constraints: 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) ≤  𝜆𝜆𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥  𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, …𝑁𝑁   (12) 
𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) ≥  𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚       (13) 
0 ≤ 𝜆𝜆 ≤ 1         (14) 
Where 
𝜆𝜆: The compromise variable that captures the possible ranges for each objective function (Decision 
Variable)  
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: Best (minimum) value of 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) in case it is considered as the sole objective function subject 
to Eqs. 2 to 9.2 and 10 as constraints   
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥: Best (maximum) value of 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) in case it is considered as the sole objective function subject 
to Eqs. 2 to 9.2 and 10 as constraints   
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𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥: Worst (maximum) value of 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) among all single objective solutions   
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: Worst (minimum) value of 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) among all single objective solutions 
 
By maximizing the value of 𝜆𝜆, the best compromise among the objectives is identified, with 
constraints 12 and 13 capturing the trade-offs among the objectives and ensuring that all objective 
functions get as close as possible to their optimal values. 
The peculiar attribute of the above model rests in the restricted ordering schedules and 
quantities (due to unavailability of pathways) by advocating nonlinear ordering and distribution 
costs (to incorporate quantity discount) achieved through multi-level inventories. In this sense, the 
model has to arrive at the best order quantity within a feasible schedule considering ordering and 
transportation costs and capacities as well as the perceived collective discounts. In addition, the 
effect of cooperation in such a supply chain and the conditions that could encourage or discourage 
them from cooperation will be investigated. In the next section, the proposed model will be applied 
to a case study of representative northern communities to show its applicability and to gain insights 
on the impact of bioenergy hubs for dispersed communities in northern Canada, as a means of 
improving the economies of scale and making the switching to biomass (from diesel) more cost-
efficient.  
 
4. Case Study 
The case study considers three Quebec northernmost Inuit communities of Kangigsujuaq (KA), 
Salluit (SA), and Ivujivik (IV) in Nunavik region. These communities are remote and off-grid and 
located by the Hudson strait. They are currently relying on off-grid diesel facilities for electricity 
generation, with installed capacities of 1.5, 3, and 1.0 MW (Hydro-Quebec 2008), serving a 
population of 696, 1347, and 370, respectively  (Statistics Canada 2012). Location of these 
communities is unique from a supply chain perspective as they can only be served by waterways 
from the east through the Hudson Bay as well as from the west through Labrador Sea (Figure 2).  
Establishing biomass as the fuel for electricity generation will benefit these communities 
from an energy security perspective (through diversifying the energy sources and relying on a 
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source (biomass) that is less susceptible to fluctuations in energy prices) and provides them with 
emission reduction (NRCan, 2015; Laganière et al., 2017). It shall be mentioned that biomass as a 
fuel is not considered entirely carbon neutral due to emissions involved in preparation and 
transportation of biomass (Woods et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2015).  In this regard, diesel facilities 
could serve as backup capacities ensuring an energy production mix for base and peak needs. This 
fuel diversification plan is challenging as the size of these communities and their remoteness 
diminishes the economies of scale for biomass supply. The biomass has to come from distant 
suppliers, where the lack of local sources and the small scale of the supply require a coordinated 
supply chain network. As such, aggregating the needs of these communities will increase the scale 
of the supply and will improve the economies of scale. Consequently, ordering one type of biomass 
(ex. pellets) will be a key factor in improving the cost efficiency through bundling of the orders 
(received from suppliers) at the hubs. The unique location of these communities provides them 
with an opportunity to receive biomass supply via two alternative pathways, through Hudson Bay 
and through Labrador Sea, to benefit from competitive offers at each side and to reduce the risk of 
shortage. We consider two hubs (one representing each pathway) due to small scale of deliveries. 
It can be concluded that adding more hubs could diminish the economies of scale at each pathway 
(lowering the collective quantities handled through each hub). 
To achieve the above targets, there is a need for creation of biomass hubs on each side of 
the supply chain that could serve these communities, and to identify the optimal order quantities 
and schedules from the suppliers in line with the energy needs of the communities throughout the 
year and the availability of transportation through the waterways. There would be two alternative 
coordination scenarios. There is the non-cooperative scenario, in which each community is 
optimizing its own pay-off and the hubs optimizing their own payoffs as well, and the cooperative 
option, in which the communities look for a collective solution and are consolidated with the hubs 
as one entity.   
Case study considers two alternative hubs, one in Eastmain (k=1) in the west of Quebec 
(QC) province and the other one in Bathurst (k=2) in the northeast of New Brunswick (NB) 
province, representing the two pathways of biomass supply. The hub in NB could receive supplies 
from three suppliers in QC, NB, and the state of Maine in the US (i=1,2,3), while the hub in 
Eastmain could receive supplies from three QC suppliers (i=4,5,6). Considering these 
circumstances, it is assumed that the time between ordering biomass and receiving it at inventories 
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is less than one month at both hubs (i.e. orders originated from suppliers) and communities (i.e. 
orders originated from the hubs). To benefit from the delivery quantity discounts, and to reduce the 
hassles of arrangements with shipping companies, biomass deliveries are done only in May and 
August from the ports near the hub locations to the communities. This ordering restriction is also 
reflecting the normal shipping season in the north (May to August) when the main waterways are 
free of ice. The information and assumptions about the communities, hubs, and suppliers are 
summarized in Tables 1 to 5.  
 In this regard, properties of biomass (wood pellets) and conversion facilities are 
approximated from the literature including biomass-to-electricity levelized costs, loading factor, 
and conversion rates for electricity generation facilities that use pellets (Nasiri and Huang 2008, 
NEB 2017, IRENA 2018). A planning horizon of one year is considered to enable development of 
an annual energy production plan. The monthly energy demand (equivalent to 720 hours) values 
are derived from the latest annual demand profiles reported for these communities (Hydro-Quebec 
2002) and the latest average monthly trends reported by Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada 2016), 
assuming that the per capita electricity demand has not changed considerably during this time 
(reflecting the population and climate stability).  
The hubs to community delivery costs and time are estimated based on the schedule and 
rates provided by Nunavik Eastern Arctic Shipping Inc. (NEAS 2018a, 2018b). The biomass (bulk 
pellet) purchase and delivery prices are assumed based on a survey of market prices offered from 
various pellet suppliers in QC, NB, and the US, reflecting the fact that the supply pathway from 
Hudson Bay requires longer road transport to Eastmain. It is initially assumed that each community 
aims at installing a 500 KW biomass-to-electricity conversion facility with their levelized capital 
and operational costs included in the model (Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) 
2017).  
In the next section, the solutions obtained from the proposed model under cooperative and 
non-cooperative coordination scenarios will be obtained and interpreted in line with the above 
inputs and assumptions. The ultimate aim would be to investigate the impact of quantity discounts 
and hub coordination on biomass uptake (% of electricity from biomass) by these communities and 
to provide a comparison with the existing all diesel option in terms of the unit costs incurred by the 




5. Results Analysis 
In this section, we first discuss some characteristics of the proposed model. Then, we turn to 
interpretation of the results related to each coordination scenario. Further insights will be provided 
on the effect of hubs as well as suppliers’ quantity discounts. Finally, a comparison of the outcomes 
of alternative supply chain pathways will be provided with respect to cost and share of biomass.  
The model was optimized using the latest OpenSolver version 2.9.0 (OpenSolver 2018), 
with NOMAD (Nonlinear Optimization by Mesh Adaptive Direct Search) (NOMAD 2018). This 
optimizer is well suited with nonlinear models having more constraints and lesser number of 
variables. The case study deals with 180 variables and 300 constraints (including additional 
constraints to reflect the fact about no hub-community deliveries outside May and August months). 
With an active delivery season running from May to August, the start of the planning year is set at 
the month of April. In the cooperative scenario, the aggregated supply chain and production costs 
(collectively coordinated for the communities) are minimized, with purchasing, delivering, and 
storing decisions to sustain electricity production from biomass during the year. In the non-
cooperative scenario, the hub acts as an entity maximizing its pay-off (gains from selling biomass 
to communities minus aggregated sourcing and hub storage costs). Each individual community is 
minimizing its own cost that corresponds to biomass ordering and storage as well as energy 
production activities at each community. The later scenario presents a multi-objective optimization 
problem. By adopting a compromise programming approach, each objective function (community 
costs and hub payoffs) is optimized subject to the model constraints. Table 6 presents the outcomes 
of these single objective optimizations showing the conflicts among them. From that table the best 
and worst values of the objective functions are fed into the compromise program presented through 
Eqs. 11-14 and subject to all other constraints of the model. By maximizing the value of the 
compromise index (𝜆𝜆), each objective function will approach its best value as far as the feasible 
region of the problem allows.   
Tables 7 to 12 present a summary of the obtained optimal solutions for each coordination 
scenario, including quantity and schedule of deliveries from suppliers, inventory levels at hubs, 
quantity and schedule of deliveries to communities, local inventory levels, and electricity 
production from biomass. As the results show, at the presence of hubs, the supplier capacities can 
be fully exhausted, arriving at the highest supplier quantity discounts. The hub inventories start to 
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accumulate from April with a full dispatch in May, followed by another round of accumulation 
until the second full dispatch in August. Generation of electricity from biomass commences in May 
with steady production until December when the biomass inventories decline and gradually come 
to an end without a chance for re-stocking due to unavailability of waterways. 
To demonstrate the role of quantity discounts and the existence of hubs in promoting the 
share of biomass in electricity generation and in improving the economies of scale, the coordination 
models have been optimized under a combination of hub coordination and quantity discount 
scenarios as listed in Table 13. The total cost of energy production, its unit cost (as a measure of 
the economies of scale), and the share of biomass in electricity generation mix are presented under 
these scenarios. The unit cost ($/KWh) is calculated by distributing the total cost of each scenario 
($) to total electricity generated (KWh) from biomass and diesel sources over the scope of the study 
(one year). 
In the non-cooperative case, the aim of each community to arrive at a minimum cost triggers 
a competition among communities. Thus, the main operational difference between the cooperative 
and non-cooperative coordination cases is that, in the former case, both biomass ordering and 
delivery from hubs are collectively coordinated, while in the latter case, only deliveries from hubs 
are collective and the orders are received by hubs from the communities independently. In this 
sense, the communities will lose the opportunity of receiving collective discounts for ordering from 
the hubs. This creates a chain of effects from the communities to the suppliers. Suppliers 4, 5, and 
6, that offer a higher price (as per Table 5) supplying to hub 2 (reflecting a more costly 
transportation pathway), will receive lower demands in the non-cooperative case (as presented in 
Table 7). As a result, the capability of hub 2 in accumulation of biomass is compromised causing 
lower inventory levels for this hub (Table 9). This in turn will affect not only the extent of deliveries 
arriving from hub 2 but also the number of times deliveries are taking place (Table 10) as well as 
the cost of deliveries (Table 11). In this situation, the communities will place a higher emphasis on 
hub 1 to an extent that the community of IV (j=3) will not receive any deliveries from the hub 2 in 
located New Brunswick. As such, the share of biomass will be reduced in the non-cooperative 
scenarios compared to their cooperative case as presented in Table 13. 
The optimal solutions, obtained with quantity discounts and hubs for each coordination 
case, are presented in Table 13. In the cooperative case, there will be a 61% share for biomass and 
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a unit cost of $172 for each MWh of electricity generated, almost 20% less than a diesel only 
solution (i.e. 𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 0) that yields a unit cost of $212 per MWh. In the non-cooperative case, 
smaller communities will benefit more from the coordination of deliveries (even with no collective 
ordering). This is reflecting fact that smaller communities are dealing with lower demand for 
electricity, and as such, any amount of delivered biomass could have a bigger impact on their 
energy production mix. Overall, biomass will still remain a competitive option versus the diesel. 
The share of biomass ranges from 34.9% to 54.7% reflected by the variations in the unit costs from 
$157 to $178 per MWh of generated electricity. 
Without supplier quantity discounts (i.e. 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈), the supply of biomass to 
communities via hubs will continue but with a slightly higher overall unit cost leading to a similar 
share for biomass in the electricity mix in both coordination scenarios. With no collective 
inventories at hubs (i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) = 0), the share of the biomass in the electricity mix in both 
coordination scenarios will be significantly reduced, as the lack of big inventories (buffers) with 
the presence of a restricted schedule for biomass deliveries to communities, diminishes the 
quantities of deliveries leading to only short lived biomass production periods right after the 
deliveries in May and August, with much higher unit costs. As the results in Table 13 reveals, 
smaller communities will be in a better position if they opt for non-cooperative coordination as 
even small deliveries of biomass could form a considerable share of their electricity mix. Despite 
the above fact, the overall contribution of biomass into the generation of electricity in these 
communities will be reduced (as presented in Table 12). The case of no inventories at hubs is 
further considered in case of eliminating the supplier quantity discounts (i.e. 𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡) = 0 and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡) =
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈), resulting in a similarly low share for biomass in both coordination scenarios. With no hub 
inventories, the unit cost will be  lower in the cooperative case with supplier discounts at $197 per 
MWh and increases to $201 per MWh in the case with no supplier discounts. In summary, the 
smaller communities will not be motivated to take part in a cooperative coordination and prefer a 
non-cooperative coordination. The latter scheme is still a means of coordination, reflecting the fact 
that communities do not prefer to cooperate but prefer to work with a hub that coordinates the 
supply (through collective inventory) of biomass. No community will have the incentive to deviate 
from participation in such a non-cooperative hub-based coordination. 
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The final case (of no discount and no inventories at hubs), against a backdrop of some 
uncertainties in biomass supply chains (such as availability, quality, and durability issues of 
biomass), reflects the current situation with many northern communities, and has discouraged them 
from adopting biomass electricity generation capacities. The above results demonstrate that the 
incorporation of hubs in biomass supply chains, serving northern communities, can address the 
availability issue and improve the economies of scale such that biomass can have a considerable 
share in electricity profile of these communities. However, to ensure that biomass becomes the 
dominant fuel for electricity generation in the north, a cooperative coordination pathway is 
required, where the communities join forces to support collective orders and deliveries. To 
motivate a cooperative scheme among the communities, external incentives by the government or 
power companies might be required. 
 
6. Discussion 
A key aspect of the above results was the finding that all four biomass scenarios in both 
coordination cases lead to a reduction in the unit cost of energy generation. Therefore, even in 
scenarios where biomass is not the dominant fuel for energy generation, a cost reduction is still 
achieved. The cost efficiencies are significantly increased in the scenarios where biomass is the 
dominant fuel. Therefore, for these remote communities, the addition of biomass as a 
complementary source of energy implies that a dual desirable outcome of cost efficiency and 
reduced negative environmental impacts can be achieved. Clearly the availability of discounts and 
the use of storage hubs are important to improving cost efficiencies and the potential for other 
incentives from government may further improve the efficiencies achieved.  
Despite no direct incentive envisioned from the government for biomass-to-electricity 
conversion in these communities, the study observed the effect of biomass hubs in consolidating a 
collective (larger scale) biomass supply. With hubs, a remarkable reduction in unit cost of biomass-
to-electricity conversion is achieved as demonstrated in Table 3 (due to higher supplier discounts 
for coordinated orders). The scenarios with hub involvement (coordination) correspond to up to 
20% reduction in the unit costs. This is due to the effect of the economies of scale. With a small 
scale of electricity generation in these communities, without the hubs (and coordination) in place, 
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the share of biomass in electricity mix could be as low as 21% (Table 3) and diesel remains as the 
dominating fuel. With hubs (coordination), this share could increase up to 61%. In non-cooperative 
coordination scenarios, hub’s coordination will result in a compromise between hub’s profit 
(objective) and individual communities’ cost (objectives). Thus, in this case, the hub has to accept 
a compromise on its profit in order to allow for the communities to achieve cost efficiency in 
preferring biomass to diesel.     
While this study was based on the case of northern communities in Canada, the findings provide 
strong indications for the use of biomass in other parts of the world. The provision of grid power 
can be expensive or technically complex to communities in difficult geographical locations where 
weather-based factors such as snow and topographical-based factors such as mountains and 
rivers/swamps dominate. Such complexities are further pronounced if the communities are small 
and relatively dispersed. The potential to adopt biomass as a complement or replacement to any 
current sources of energy provide a significant opportunity for better efficiencies. The ability to 
store biomass material not only implies the potential to eliminate the need for continuous delivery 
to such difficult geographical locations but also boosts energy security and can have a strong 
positive impact on quality of life. This transition could also promote institutional change in energy 
industry fostering new regulations and management practices (Genus and Mafakheri 2014).  
In summary, the viability of biomass as a main or complementary source of energy for remote 
communities will need to be considered on a case-by-case basis taking into account various factors 
such as supply chain networks, unique geographical characteristics, community acceptance, current 
power generation attributes, availability and type of biomass amongst others (De Meyer et al. 
2015). The locations of the two hubs in QC and NB were carefully chosen to represent the only 
alternative supply chain pathways through Hudson Bay and Labrador Sea. These hubs are located 
further from the communities, encouraging suppliers to work with these hubs, as the major share 
of transportation costs will not be borne by them. The choice of suppliers in QC, NB, and the state 
of Maine in the US was decided based on the feasibility of supply to the hubs in Quebec and New 
Brunswick. The adopted biomass prices reflect this geographical-based choice as well as suppliers’ 
scale of production and closeness to biomass sources. If the choices of suppliers change, or if 
biomass is advocated for a different geography, the model might end up with different results, 
however, the same model can be adopted for decision making.  
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As for biomass, fuel prices are showing more stability and are not subject to fluctuations in the 
wider energy market prices, conducting a sensitivity analysis on diesel prices would be a valuable 
contribution. However, as this study has adopted a levelized costing of electricity generation (for 
both diesel and biomass) to reflect on a long-term commitment to diversification of energy sources, 
the proposed model cannot capture the effect of short-term fluctuations in diesel prices. In this 
regard, however, it is worth mentioning that biomass (and diesel) deliveries to communities is done 
only a few times a year based on agreed price ranges and discounting mechanism preceding the 
deliveries. This reduces the ability of communities to have sudden impacts from changes in diesel 
prices. Diesel is also purchased well ahead of time and stored for a longer period of time in these 
communities.  
It should be mentioned that suppliers’ selling prices will be lowered with the coordination in 
place. However, this is reflective of the quantity discounts on offer. The suppliers offered a range 
of acceptable prices for coordinated purchase. The coordination gradually directs the prices 
towards the lower bound of this range. This is not desirable for suppliers, but in return, lower prices 
increases the quantity of biomass sale. 
This study has important implications for society and research. For the northern communities 
in Canada and for other similar communities, there is an urgent need to explore the potential of 
biomass as a potential main source of energy. The availability of biomass material and the ability 
to store them suggests than not only can power be generated at a lower cost, but it can be done in 
an environmentally friendly manner. For industry producers of biomass material, the study 
highlights the availability of potential new markets that may be viable even when situated in 
geographical locations with access limitations. For government, there is the potential to reduce 
emissions generation by supporting, promoting and possibly providing incentives for the use of 
biomass as an alternative source of energy in communities that are too geographically remote to be 
connected to the main grid. It shall be mentioned that the cost is rationally assumed to be the main 
factor in deciding about the choice of energy sources for northern communities. However, if some 
users want to opt for non-bioenergy options, such as installing small scale wind or solar 
technologies, their needs shall be subtracted from the demand predictions used as inputs for the 





This study presented a supply chain modelling approach to formulate the case of electricity 
generation from biomass in off-grid northern communities as an alternative to diesel. The 
cooperative and non-cooperative coordination scenarios among these communities were presented 
through collective and multi-objective optimization problems, respectively. The incorporation of 
coordinated biomass hubs and quantity discounts were advocated demonstrating their potential in 
improving the economies of scale in electricity generation. Such a diversification of energy sources 
is of particular importance to northern communities, improving their resilience as well as reducing 
their carbon emission generation. Due to higher prices of diesel in the north, biomass could assume 
a higher share of the market even without a direct incentive from the Government. The case of 
three off-grid communities in Nunavik was considered, potentially receiving biomass supplies via 
alternative waterways in the absence of road networks. The results pointed to the significant role 
of hubs in creating coordinated buffer capacities that could ensure a sustained production of 
electricity from biomass with the presence of quantity discounts. The price reduction that results 
would be beneficial to the local economy of these remote parts of Canada. 
 This study could be further extended in many ways. First, a supplier selection system could 
be coupled with the proposed model to rank the suppliers according to a number of prequalification 
criteria, and on that basis, prioritize the order quantities (Mafakheri et al. 2011). In addition, the 
durability of biomass materials could be incorporated into the model by assuming a decay rate for 
them. Such decays particularly diminish the local inventories steadily throughout the year. The 
possibility of using varied biomass materials could be considered as a way of extending the supply 
capacities and further increasing the share of biomass in off-grid electricity generation in the north. 
The monthly generation plans could be translated into hourly generation schedules by coupling the 
proposed model with an operational model of electricity generation facilities in daily peak and base 
periods. The impact of a direct or indirect government incentive for bioenergy production in the 
north could be considered. The incentive could be an indirect one, in form of an emission regulatory 
mechanism (Palak et al. 2014), or could be a direct benefit allocated per KWh of electricity 
generated from biomass (Nasiri and Zaccour 2010). In both cases, the incentive will compensate 
the supply chain and production costs of bioenergy generation. The main benefit of such an 
incentive would be in creation of a surge towards investing in bioenergy generation. The main 
23 
 
drawback would be the fact that, with the existence of an incentive, producers might opt for less 
cost-efficient bioenergy generation technologies creating a lasting dependency to an incentive 
(Grant and Clarke 2010).  
The environmental costs associated with energy generation could also be incorporated into 
the model in form of a penalty or pollution constraints. This could further incentivize biomass over 
diesel. In addition, the competition among suppliers could also be formulated through a bi-level 
model. In the lower level model, the optimal biomass electricity generation capacities and plans 
are identified. In the upper level model, the suppliers will compete to fulfil the energy generation 
plan. In addition, a location analysis model (Rentizelas and Tatsiopoulos 2010) could be linked to 
the proposed model such that the location and number of hubs could be optimally identified among 
the possible choices considering their distances and subsequent delivery costs.  
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multiobjective possibilistic problem through compromise programming." European Journal of 
Operational Research 164, no. 3 (2005): 748-759.  
Paré, David, Pierre Bernier, Evelyne Thiffault, and Brian D. Titus. "The potential of forest biomass 
as an energy supply for Canada." The Forestry Chronicle 87, no. 1 (2011): 71-76. 
Rahman, R. “Feasibility analysis of wood-biomass energy generation for the off-grid community 
of Brochet in North-west Manitoba”, MB, Canada (2014). 
Rentizelas, Athanasios A., Athanasios J. Tolis, and Ilias P. Tatsiopoulos. "Logistics issues of 
biomass: The storage problem and the multi-biomass supply chain." Renewable and sustainable 
energy reviews 13, no. 4 (2009): 887-894. 
Rentizelas, Athanasios A., and Ilias P. Tatsiopoulos. "Locating a bioenergy facility using a hybrid 
optimization method." International Journal of Production Economics 123, no. 1 (2010): 196-
209. 
Sarkar, S., Kumar, A., & Sultana, A. “Biofuels and biochemicals production from forest biomass 
in Western Canada.” Energy, 36, no. 10 (2011): 6251-6262. 
Sarkar, Biswajit. "Supply chain coordination with variable backorder, inspections, and discount 
policy for fixed lifetime products." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2016 (2016). 
Shahabi, Mehrdad, Shirin Akbarinasaji, Avinash Unnikrishnan, and Rachel James. "Integrated 
inventory control and facility location decisions in a multi-echelon supply chain network with 
hubs." Networks and Spatial Economics 13, no. 4 (2013): 497-514. 
Statistics Canada. “Census profiles: Census 2011”, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON (2012). 
Statistics Canada. “Electric power statistics: 2015”, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, ON (2016). 
Sun, Fangzhou, Maichel M. Aguayo, Rahul Ramachandran, and Subhash C. Sarin. "Biomass 
feedstock supply chain design–a taxonomic review and a decomposition-based methodology." 
International Journal of Production Research 56, no. 17 (2018): 5626-5659. 
Tong, Jordan, Gregory DeCroix, and Jing-Sheng Song. "Modeling payment timing in multiechelon 
inventory systems with applications to supply chain coordination." Manufacturing & Service 
Operations Management (2019), accepted-in press.  
Yazan, Devrim Murat, A. Claudio Garavelli, Antonio Messeni Petruzzelli, and Vito Albino. "The 
effect of spatial variables on the economic and environmental performance of bioenergy 
production chains." International journal of production economics 131, no. 1 (2011): 224-233.  
28 
 
Zandi Atashbar, Nasim, Nacima Labadie, and Christian Prins. "Modelling and optimisation of 
biomass supply chains: a review." International Journal of Production Research 56, no. 10 
(2018): 3482-3506. 
Zhang, Qinhong, Ming Dong, Jianwen Luo, and Anders Segerstedt. "Supply chain coordination 
with trade credit and quantity discount incorporating default risk." International Journal of 






List of Symbols 
 
Suppliers: 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑀𝑀;  
Communities: 𝑗𝑗 = 1,2, …𝑁𝑁; 
Hubs: 𝑘𝑘 = 1,2, …𝐾𝐾;  
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡): Biomass price (including transportation) offered by supplier ‘i’ for delivery to hub centre 
‘k’ at time ‘t’ ($/Kg) 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡): Biomass delivery from supplier ‘i’ to hub centre ‘k’ at time ‘t’ (Kg): Decision Variable 
𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘: Holding cost at hub ‘k’ per unit of time ($/Kg) 
ℎ𝑘𝑘
(𝑡𝑡): Biomass inventory level at hub ‘k’ at time ‘t’ (Kg)  
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡): Biomass ordering/delivery cost from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ ($/Kg)  
𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡): Biomass delivery from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (Kg): Decision Variable  
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗: Holding cost at local biomass inventory of community ‘j’ per unit of time ($/Kg)  
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡): Local biomass inventory level at community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (Kg)  
𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗: Delivery time between hub ‘k’ and community ‘j’ (Month) 
𝑧𝑧𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡): Electricity generation from biomass in community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (KWh): Decision Variable 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗: Levelized biomass-to-electricity conversion cost in community ‘j’ including capital and 
operational costs ($/KWh) 
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗: Levelized electricity generation cost from alternative (diesel) fuel in facility of community ‘j’ 
at time ‘t’ including capital, operational and fuel costs ($/KWh) 
𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗
(𝑡𝑡): Electricity demand of community ‘j’ at time ‘t’ (KWh) 
30 
 
𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘: Delivery time between supplier ‘i’ and hub ‘k’ (Month) 
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗: Biomass conversion rate in biomass-to-electricity conversion facility of community ‘j’ 
(KWh/Kg) 
𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗: Capacity of biomass electricity generation facility in community ‘j’ (KW) 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗: Loading factor of biomass electricity generation facility in community ‘j’  
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗: Capacity of local biomass inventory at community ‘j’ (Kg) 
ℎ𝑘𝑘: Capacity of hub ‘k’ (Kg) 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖: Biomass supply capacity of supplier ‘i’ (Kg) 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈: Biomass price of supplier ‘i’ with no discount ($/Kg)    
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿: Biomass price of supplier ‘i’ with full discount ($/Kg) 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝑈𝑈 : Biomass order/delivery cost from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ with no discount ($/Kg) 
𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝐿𝐿 : Biomass order/delivery cost from hub ‘k’ to community ‘j’ with full discount ($/Kg) 
𝜆𝜆: The compromise variable that captures the possible ranges for each objective function: Decision 
Variable  
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚: Best (minimum) value of 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) in case it is considered as the sole objective function subject 
to Eqs. 2 to 9.2 and 10 as constraints   
𝐻𝐻𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥: Best (maximum) value of 𝐻𝐻(𝑇𝑇) in case it is considered as the sole objective function subject 
to Eqs. 2 to 9.2 and 10 as constraints   
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑥𝑥: Worst (maximum) value of 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
(𝑇𝑇) among all single objective solutions   






Figure 1 – A supply chain network with suppliers (S1 to M), hubs (H1 to K), and community demand 
(D1 to N) and inventories (I1 to N)  
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𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗 500 500 500 
𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 200,000 200,000 1500,000 
𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 0.004 0.003 0.004 
𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 0.046 0.044 0.048 
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 0.208 0.215 0.207 
𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 0.80 0.85 0.80 
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 4.7 4.8 4.6 
 










April 186,300 351,500 100,500 
May 171,900 324,400 92,800 
June 171,000 322,600 92,300 
July 180,900 341,200 97,600 
August 179,700 339,100 97,000 
September 168,700 318,300 91,100 
October 178,700 337,100 96,400 
November 194,800 367,500 105,100 
December 216,800 409,000 117,000 
January 246,900 465,900 133,300 
February 226,500 427,400 122,300 
March 219,900 414,900 118,700 
 







𝐻𝐻𝑘𝑘 350,000 400,000 





























𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑈𝑈 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 
1 0.205 0.168 33,300 
2 0.210 0.170 34,000 
3 0.200 0.175 34,700 
4 0.215 0.190 37,000 
5 0.220 0.190 35,000 
6 0.220 0.185 34,000 
 
Table 6 – Single objective optimizations and the resulting values for objective functions 
Optimization Objective Functions C1(T) C2(T) C3(T) H(T) 
Min C1(T)  325,300  950,064  261,669  41,050  
Min C2(T) 487,157  704,622  261,669  47,663  
Min C3(T) 487,157  950,064  166,322  32,471  
Max H(T) 415,560  843,649  255,501  124,270  
 
Table 7 – Supplier deliveries (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)) under cooperative (CO) and non-cooperative (NC) scenarios 
Month k=1 k=2 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 
CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC 
April 33,300 33,300 34,000 34,000 34,700 34,700 34,224 13,003 35,000 35,000 34,000 17,000 
May 33,300 33,300 34,000 34,000 34,700 34,700 37,000 37,000 35,000 35,000 34,000 34,000 
June 33,300 33,300 34,000 34,000 34,700 34,700 37,000 0 35,000 2,014 34,000 517 
July 33,300 33,300 34,000 34,000 34,700 34,700 37,000 488 35,000 0 34,000 783 





Table 8 – Supplier prices (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘(𝑡𝑡)) under CO and NC scenarios 
Month k=1 k=2 
i=1 i=2 i=3 i=4 i=5 i=6 
CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC 
April 0.168 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.175 0.192 0.206 0.190 0.190 0.185 0.203 
May 0.168 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.185 0.185 
June 0.168 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.215 0.190 0.218 0.185 0.219 
July 0.168 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.215 0.190 0.220 0.185 0.219 
August 0.168 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.175 0.175 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.185 0.185 
 
Table 9 – Inventory level at hubs (ℎ𝑘𝑘
(𝑡𝑡)) under CO and NC scenarios 
Month k=1 k=2 
CO NC CO NC 
April 102,000 102,000 103,224 65,003 
May 0 0 49,071 0 
June 102,000 102,000 155,071 2,582 
July 204,000 204,000 261,071 1,271 
August 0 0 0 0 
 















CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC 
April - - - - - - - - - - - - 
May 62,456 0 10,4285 204,000 37,259 0 48,990 94,295 86,965 11,705 24,198 0 
June - - - - - - - - - - - - 
July - - - - - - - - - - - - 
August 106,103 155,673 123,392 0 76,505 150,327 132,131 0 140,358 106,000 94,582 0 
 
Table 11 – Delivery cost from hubs to communities (𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗















CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC 
April - - - - - - - - - - - - 
May 0.288 0.362 0.288 0.288 0.288 0.362 0.352 0.375 0.352 0.405 0.352 0.409 
June - - - - - - - - - - - - 
July - - - - - - - - - - - - 





Table 12 – Electricity generation and local inventories at communities under CO and NC scenarios 
Month 
Communities 





CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC CO NC 
April 0 0  0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0  
May 171,900 63,947 74,872 80,689 306,000 306,000 127,500 151,955 92,800 0 41,283 0 
June 171,000 171,000 38,489 44,306 306,000 306,000 63,750 88,205 92,300 0 21,217 0 
July 180,900 180,900 0 5,817 306,000 306,000 0 24,455 97,600 0 0 0 
August 179,700 0 200,000 161,489 306,000 14,185 200,000 127,500 97,000 129,240 150,000 97,000 
September 168,700 168,700 164,106 125,596 306,000 0 136,250 127,500 91,100 109,436 130,196 91,100 
October 178,700 178,700 126,085 87,574 306,000 306,000 72,500 63,750 96,400 88,480 109,239 96,400 
November 194,800 194,800 84,638 46,128 306,000 306,000 8,750 0 105,100 65,632 86,391 105,100 
December 216,800 216,800 38,511 0 42,000 0 0 0 117,000 40,197 60,957 117,000 
January 181,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 133,300 11,219 31,978 133,300 
February 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 122,300 0 5,391 51,606 





Table 13 – Total and unit cost of energy production for various coordination and configuration scenarios  
Scenarios Assessment Criteria 
No biomass 
(diesel only) 























Total Cost ($) 1,698,889 1,378,503 1,517,896 1,578,842 1,607,675 
Unit Cost 
($/KWh) 0.212 0.172 0.185 0.197 0.201 
Biomass share 






(j=1) 487,157 381,986 384,049 434,147 434,147 
SA 
(j=2) 950,064 790,581 793,709 869,678 869,679 
IV 




(j=1) 0.208 0.162 0.164 0.185 0.185 
SA 
(j=2) 0.215 0.178 0.180 0.197 0.197 
IV 




(j=1) 0% 50.2% 50.4% 27.1% 27.1% 
SA 
(j=2) 0% 34.9% 34.6% 21.3% 21.3% 
IV 
(j=3) 0% 54.7% 55.2% 30.9% 30.9% 
 
 
